



NEWSLETTER

CONSTRUCTION INFRASTRUCTURE UPDATES

MONDAY, OCTOBER 21 - 26, 2026

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India Has 998 Km Of Metro Lines Under Construction Across 26 Cities, Says Union Minister Tokhan Sahu

PTI,

October 26, 2026



Aerial view of the Metro line(@nammametrobengaluru/Facebook)

India is building another 998 km of metro rail lines as the country expands urban public transport, Union Minister of State for Housing and Urban Affairs Tokhan Sahu said on Friday (23 October).

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The ongoing projects will add to an operational network that has grown to more than 1,185 km across 26 cities, from 248 km in 2014.

Speaking at the 19th Urban Mobility India Conference and Exhibition 2026 in Odisha, Sahu said metro expansion, digital ticketing and electric bus programmes were helping make urban transport more accessible and sustainable.

"The work is underway on another 998 km of metro lines. The expansion of metro networks, along with initiatives such as the National Common Mobility Card, QR-based ticketing and PM e-Bus Sewa, is transforming urban mobility and making public transport more accessible and sustainable," he was quoted as saying by *PTI*.

The two-day conference, being held in Odisha for the first time, has been organised by the Union Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs through the Institute of Urban Transport (India), with support from the state government. This year's theme is 'Urban Accessibility and Liveability in Digital Age'.

Sahu said urban development should be assessed by how safely and comfortably people could move around cities, with particular attention to women, children, senior citizens and persons with disabilities.

Capital Region Urban Transport operates around 800 buses across eight cities. The state is also expanding electric vehicle infrastructure and introducing digital ticketing and measures to increase women's participation as drivers.

MoHUA Secretary Satendra Singh said around 1,500 delegates from India and abroad were expected at the conference, which features technical sessions, round-table discussions and research symposiums on urban transport.

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Kalpataru Projects Bags Rs 2,349 Crore Orders Across Power Transmission And Buildings Segments In India

The business Standard,
October 22, 2026

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Kalpataru Projects International Limited announced today (21 October) that it has secured new orders and award notifications worth approximately Rs 2,349 crore across its power transmission and distribution and buildings and factories businesses in India.

The Mumbai-based engineering and construction major announced that the contracts span major projects in both segments, received in the normal course of business.

The latest wins push Kalpataru Projects International's year-to-date order inflows for FY27 past the Rs 22,000 crore mark, underscoring strong operational momentum in the domestic infrastructure space.

The company operates across power transmission lines, water infrastructure, railways, and urban buildings, with a presence in 75 countries globally.

Manish Mohnot, managing director and chief executive of the firm, said the new contract wins solidify the company's leading market position in India's fast-growing infrastructure landscape.

He noted that the orders reinforce the firm's engineering, procurement, and construction capabilities and proven track record of executing projects both domestically and internationally.

Earlier this month, Kalpataru Projects announced separate orders totalling approximately Rs 2,225 crore, including Rs 2,031 crore from the transmission and distribution business in India and international markets, and Rs 194 crore from its Swedish subsidiary Linjemontage.

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Maharashtra Plans 2,500–5,000-Acre Chemical Industry Park Near Vadhvan Port, Seeks Centre's Approval

The Hindu Business Line,
October 26, 2026

Maharashtra plans to develop a major chemical industry park near Vadhvan Port, with the state government proposing to allocate between 2,500 and 5,000 acres for the project.

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Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis announced the plan at the inauguration of India Chem 2026 in Goregaon, seeking the Centre's approval for the proposed industrial hub.

Fadnavis said the state was also preparing a separate policy to encourage investment in the chemical sector, which is expected to be announced in the first week of November.

The Chief Minister said Maharashtra was working to simplify industrial approvals and improve access to government services through the Maitri single-window platform and the Invest Maharashtra initiative.

The chemical industry currently provides around three lakh jobs in the state, with the potential to double employment, he added.

The proposed park comes as the Centre pushes its Grand Chemical Park scheme. Union Minister for Chemicals and Fertilisers J P Nadda said the Union Budget had earmarked Rs 1,000 crore for the initiative, while participating state governments would contribute Rs 500 crore.

Projects must have at least 2,000 acres of land, and the Centre would facilitate environmental clearances, he said.

Nadda said the scheme formed part of the government's broader development agenda, including its ambition to build a developed India and achieve a US\$1 trillion economy by 2040.

He also said advanced chemicals and petrochemicals had been included in the Centre's Rs 1 lakh crore research, development and innovation scheme.

The proposed location near Vadhvan Port could support links between port infrastructure and chemical manufacturing. However, the project remains subject to the Centre's approval and the applicable clearances.

Dahanu taluka, where the port is being developed, was previously designated an ecologically sensitive area under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.

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Maharashtra: Thane Coastal Road-2 Gets Key Environmental Clearance Recommendation, Awaits Centre's Approval

Business Standard,
October 26, 2026

The Maharashtra Coastal Zone Management Authority (MCZMA) has recommended environmental clearance for the 7.12 km Thane Coastal Road-2 on its original alignment.

The proposal has been forwarded to the Union Environment Ministry for consideration.

The decision was taken at the authority's 202nd meeting on September 24, following a request from the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority (MMRDA), which is developing the road.

The authority had deferred the proposal in August and asked the agency to examine alternative routes to limit damage to mangroves.

The MMRDA subsequently told the MCZMA that "there is no alternative alignment which can substantially save the mangroves".

It argued that the proposed route is constrained by existing development to the west and Thane Creek to the east, leaving no feasible option to bypass the Ramsar-recognised wetland.

The project is expected to affect 3,754 mangroves across the construction area. Of these, 680, covering around 1.7 hectares, will be permanently lost where foundations for the elevated road's piers are planned.

Another 1,053 mangroves could be damaged during construction but are expected to be restored, while 2,021 are likely to remain largely unaffected.

To reduce the environmental impact, the MMRDA has proposed an elevated viaduct with the spacing between piers increased from 30 metres to 50 metres. This is intended to reduce the number of foundations required along the route.

The MCZMA's recommendation includes conditions such as compensatory mangrove plantation in consultation with the Mangrove Cell, implementation of an Environmental Management Plan and monitoring of environmental impacts.

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The project still requires approval from the Union Environment Ministry and other relevant authorities.

The greenfield road will connect Anand Nagar in Mulund East with Balkum in Thane, running alongside Thane Creek.

It is planned as an extension of Thane Coastal Road-1 and will link with the proposed Kopri-Patni bridge and the Eastern Express Highway extension.

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Delhi Plans Yamuna Riverfront On Sabarmati Model, Targets First-Phase Completion In Current Term: Report

The Hindu,
October 21, 2026

The Delhi government has begun preparations to develop the Yamuna riverfront along the lines of Ahmedabad's Sabarmati project.

According to a Times of India report, Water Minister Parvesh Verma stated that the first phase is targeted for completion during the government's current term.

The proposal includes appointing consultants and signing an agreement with the Sabarmati Riverfront Development Corporation to guide the project.

The riverfront will be developed in two phases, divided by the Wazirabad barrage. The first stretch will run from Palla to Wazirabad, followed by the section from Wazirabad to Kalindi Kunj near Okhla barrage.

The government plans to begin with the northern stretch and use it as a model for the subsequent development.

The TOI report also stated that the proposed facilities include dedicated spaces for yoga, walking, cycling and sports. The plan will improve public access to the riverbanks and create recreational areas along the Yamuna.

Verma visited the Sabarmati riverfront in August with officials from the Delhi Jal Board and the Irrigation and Flood Control Department to study its development model.

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However, cleaning the Yamuna remains a major challenge. The river flows for around 52 km through Delhi, including a heavily polluted 22 km stretch between Wazirabad and Okhla.

Past clean-up efforts have not resolved the problem, with Delhi Pollution Control Committee data showing high faecal contamination at several locations, including near Wazirabad and Nizamuddin Bridge.

Verma said 28 of Delhi's 37 sewage treatment plants had been upgraded over the preceding 18 months. The government also plans to add 250 million gallons per day (MGD) of sewage treatment capacity to address the existing shortfall.

He said the river could become visibly cleaner in around two and a half years once the treatment projects are completed.

Earlier efforts to restore the riverbanks included a 2019 Delhi Development Authority plan covering nearly 1,476 hectares of floodplains through 10 projects.

Development in these areas remains subject to environmental restrictions. The DDA has informed the National Green Tribunal that it installed 277 boundary markers along the Wazirabad–Okhla stretch.

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Chennai Airport T3 Terminal: Aviation Ministry Sets April 2027 Deadline As Construction Reaches 75 Per Cent

Swarajya,
October 22, 2026

The Ministry of Civil Aviation and the Airports Authority of India (AAI) have directed officials to complete Chennai airport's upcoming T3 international terminal by April 2027, following a review of construction progress and passenger facilities, The Hindu reported.

The latest deadline follows repeated delays in the project. Civil works at the terminal are approximately 75 per cent complete.

Spread across 86,135 square metres, the facility is expected to raise Chennai airport's annual passenger-handling capacity to 35 million once operational.

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Civil Aviation Secretary Samir Kumar Sinha, who participated in the review, stressed the need to avoid any further slippage in the construction schedule, according to the TH report.

The terminal's completion date had recently been revised from December 2026 to April 2027. The project has been under construction for several years.

Improving signage across the airport was another key issue discussed during the meeting.

Additional signs have been installed in recent weeks, while bids have been invited for a wider overhaul of signage across all three existing terminals. Sinha is likely to inspect the airport again next month.

The review also covered the Tamil Nadu government's proposal to develop a fifth terminal, T5, near the airport's remote aircraft parking bays. Sinha was briefed on the plan and recent discussions between AAI and the state government.

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Karnataka Lets Developers Build Five Times Higher But Bengaluru's Roads Are 18 Years Behind

Swarajya,
October 26, 2026



The road determines the ceiling.

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- *Karnataka's sweeping FAR revision could transform rules on how much can be built on its industrial land or repeat Bengaluru's oldest mistake: permitting density before delivering the roads, drainage, and transit to support it.*


On Harlur Road in Bengaluru's south-east, high-rise apartment towers stand beside a carriageway too narrow to serve them. The Comprehensive Development Plan of 2015 prescribed widening here — the widths were mapped, the corridors designated, the engineering logic carefully laid out.

Eleven years later, the road is what it was. The towers are not. They rose on the assumption that the road beneath them would eventually match the one drawn on the plan.

The same pattern holds on Rayasandra Road, on Kudlu, on Hosa Road, on Hykanahalli Road, and on dozens of others where major project approvals continued on the basis of prescribed road widths, as though the roads existed because they had been drawn on paper.

In Whitefield, the CDP prescribed widening along Borewell Road and Siddapura Road. The directive sat in the document while the roads stayed exactly as they were and the towers arrived anyway.

This gap between the map and the ground is not a planning curiosity or an administrative footnote. It is the central fact of Bengaluru's relationship with its own development plans, and it is the fact against which Karnataka's sweeping new FAR revision — the most ambitious density reform the state has attempted — must now be understood.



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Bengaluru has been granting building approvals based on road widths prescribed in the 2015 CDP. The roads those widths assumed have never been built. A decade of density has arrived without the infrastructure to carry it.

The Bet

The revision is, on paper, bold. By unlocking Floor Area Ratio up to 5.2 on KIADB industrial plots, against a base that until recently hovered between 1.0 and 1.5, the state has transformed the arithmetic of how its industrial land can be used in a single regulatory stroke.

The ceiling is graduated by road width — 5.2 for roads of 30 metres or wider, 4.8 for roads between 24 and 30 metres, 4.0 for roads between 18 and 24 metres — on the structural logic that a narrower road cannot absorb the density that higher FAR generates. Parking requirements have been slashed to 2 or 3 per cent on data centres and warehouses, setbacks eased, and up to 15 per cent of general KIADB plots can now be carved out for residential or commercial use where previously they could not.

S. Selvakumar, Principal Secretary at the Commerce and Industries Department, described the intent plainly: “We want each acre to support more industries and generate higher economic output.”

The surrounding language has been correspondingly ambitious — a gamechanger, a catalyst, a rethinking of Bengaluru’s industrial future from the ground skyward.

The demand-side case is genuine and worth taking seriously. Karnataka’s industrial growth has run at 9.3 per cent annually over the past decade, and its ₹1 trillion GDP ambition for 2032 demands something closer to 15 or 16 per cent.

The Chennai-Bengaluru, Bangalore-Mumbai, and Hosur-Bengaluru industrial corridors are generating demand for manufacturing, logistics, and data centre space that the old FAR regime simply could not accommodate.

Plots in zones like Bagalur and along the ITPL corridor fetch upwards of ₹25 crore per 21,750 square feet.

Under the old rules, a 10-acre allotment yielded perhaps 6.5 acres of buildable land, with the remainder consumed by surface parking, mandated setbacks, and open space. Employee housing was prohibited outright.

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
These were the planning assumptions of a different economy — land-intensive, low-rise, built for a period when expansion meant moving outward rather than upward.

That period is over. Anurag Sharma, who runs the YouTube channel All About Real Estate, captures the shift: “The old rules were designed for a truck-in, truck-out factory economy.

That is not what these corridors are being built for.”

Vertical factories, multi-level warehousing, on-site worker accommodation, ancillary retail — the kind of integrated mixed-use industrial township that global supply chain logic increasingly demands — these already exist in industrial zones across East and Southeast Asia, built precisely because land costs made horizontal sprawl indefensible. Karnataka has reached the same inflection point, and the old rules were becoming impossible to defend.

But having a good reason to revise density rules is not the same as having designed a good revision, and the distance between the two is where the trouble begins.



Raising the headline FAR number does not automatically translate into construction. With land costing ₹3,000–5,000 per square foot and construction at ₹3,500, developer margins run at roughly 20 percent before the premium FAR charge is applied — and often turn unviable after.

The Arithmetic On the Ground

Aeshvry Rajaura, a real estate consultant with expertise in land and investment advisory, is not convinced the skyline framing is even accurate. “The increase in FAR will have some effect on the skyline,” he says, “but within Bengaluru it has not been properly defined as

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which particular areas will have skylines. Developers will build higher skyscrapers wherever they can.”

Strip away the ambition and what remains, in his reading, is something more modest: “This is at its essence a revenue augmentation mechanism for the Greater Bengaluru Authority.”

He is precise about a misconception he encounters constantly. “The biggest misconception,” he says, “is that people think this policy will automatically allow higher FAR everywhere in the city, which is not the case. It is an option for developers at the end of the day.” Whether developers exercise that option depends on arithmetic the policy does not control.

The specific numbers illuminate how modest the actual uplift can be even where the policy does apply.

“In case you have a 10,000 square foot plot of land attached to a 30-metre wide road in Sarjapur,” Rajaura explains, “the developer would be accessing 3.25 FAR, so in a normal scenario one can build 32,500 square feet. An additional 0.6 FAR can be had on top of this, which makes the total FAR 3.85. So finally 38,500 square feet — which amounts to an incremental area of 6,000 square feet.”

Six thousand square feet, on a policy framed as sweeping transformation.

Whether developers pursue even that increment depends on margin. Construction costs run at around ₹3,500 per square foot, land acquisition at ₹3,000 to ₹5,000 per square foot, selling prices at approximately ₹10,000 per square foot — a margin of roughly 20 per cent.

“To this if you have to add the additional burden of extra premium charges,” Rajaura says, “this does not make any financial sense to opt for the increase in FAR.”

In micromarkets where land costs are high and selling prices have not risen commensurately, the policy’s headline number is available but not usable.

The policy’s benefits, in practice, concentrate where capital is already concentrated. “If it is a Grade A developer with large capital in hand, they will definitely take a higher premium FAR and utilise it — their revenue will increase from the same plot of land,” Rajaura says.

“For smaller developers, the margin calculation simply does not work.”

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The permission maze

There is a deeper structural problem that the revenue framing obscures. “Higher FAR does not automatically translate to taller buildings,” Rajaura says. “FAR only decides how much can be built. To what height the buildings can be built is decided by separate permissions.”

The distinction sounds technical until you realise it renders portions of the policy architecturally unusable, because those separate permissions come from local planning bodies, fire safety authorities, and across significant portions of Bengaluru, aviation regulators who cap development near HAL and the old HAL airport corridor at 120 metres or lower, with restrictions tightening as proximity to airport infrastructure increases.

A developer can hold a premium FAR entitlement — having paid the state handsomely for it — and find that exercising it requires clearing a further chain of approvals from institutions operating on their own timelines, their own criteria, and their own backlogs. FAR from one authority, height from another, fire clearance from a third, aviation NOC from a fourth.

A project that clears one hurdle may wait months or years at the next, and none of these parallel approval systems have been reformed or streamlined as part of the same policy package.

Rajaura is also precise about when the policy actually benefits anyone and when it does not. “This is best utilised when developers are beginning a project or are in the under-construction stage,” he says. “For people who have just bought already-constructed property or for residents living in an existing society, they will not necessarily benefit — the developer will not simply step in and build additional floors by taking the premium. A sanctioned plan is needed again, and all associated approvals must be taken before construction can begin.”

What this layering reveals is a state that has created a product it can sell — premium FAR entitlements — without ensuring that buyers can use what they have purchased, or that the infrastructure exists to support what they build if they do.

The revised FAR number changes what is theoretically permissible without changing the machinery through which permission must travel or the ground on which the permitted buildings must stand.

Follow the money

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This is where the revenue-grab reading of the policy becomes difficult to avoid.

Premium FAR generates fees for the state on every application, and the policy stipulates that those funds must be used only for infrastructure purposes — which sounds like a safeguard until you examine what it does not stipulate.

There is no mandate tying that revenue to the corridors or micromarkets that generated it, no requirement that the infrastructure be delivered before or even concurrent with the density it is supposed to support, and no mechanism preventing the money from disappearing into a general fund deployed at the state's discretion for whatever the state decides counts as infrastructure.

Rajaura finds this gap troubling for a specific reason. “Roads, drainage, water supply — these need to be upgraded before high-FAR approvals are granted,” he says. “Not promised. Not planned. Upgraded.” But the policy contains no such requirement. “In the policy it is mentioned that funds generated through premium FAR must be used only for infrastructure purposes,” he says, “but there is no specific mandate that it should go to a particular corridor or micromarket. The money will be going to a general infrastructure fund.”

A general fund deployed at the state's discretion is not the same as ring-fenced revenue directed to the zones absorbing the new density, and the distinction determines whether the infrastructure arrives before the towers or after.

The Peenya precedent illustrates what a more serious approach looks like. Peenya Industrial Area, covering 1,461 acres and hosting nearly 13,000 micro, small, and medium enterprises employing more than half a million workers, was designated a Special Investment Region in June 2025 — a status that industry associations had demanded for over two decades before it was granted. The designation transferred authority over infrastructure planning and spending to KIADB as the Regional Development Authority, retaining 70 per cent of locally collected property tax for reinvestment within the zone.

The logic was sound and specific: give the body responsible for industrial development control over the revenues needed to support it, and keep those revenues local.

But Peenya is the exception that proves the rule. The default under the revised FAR regime is still a general fund with no geographic ring-fencing, and the state collects premium fees from developers in Bagalur and Hoskote and Devanahalli that travel to a central pool from which they may or may not return to the zones whose density they were collected to support.

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“If that revenue goes back into the zones that generate it — into roads, drainage, power, transit — then the policy can work,” Rajaura says. “If it goes into general revenues and the infrastructure stays where it is, then you have just sold expensive permissions for future congestion.”



Under Karnataka's revised KIADB norms, how much a developer can build is now directly tied to the width of the road the plot fronts. On a 30-metre-plus road, FAR rises to 5.2 — unlocking 52,000 square metres of construction on a 10,000 square metre plot, against 15,000 under the old regime. The ladder is steep. The roads at the top of it still need to exist.

What other cities learned — and what Bengaluru abandoned

Delhi offers the sharpest comparison because it attempted something similar and got the sequencing right. The city unlocked FAR up to 5 near Metro corridors, concentrating density precisely where transit had already been delivered to absorb it. “The infrastructure, the metro policies in terms of construction and efficiency, are much better in Delhi, particularly in terms of connectivity,” Rajaura notes. “After reaching their targets in terms of kilometres of metro lines, they implemented the Transit Oriented Development policy, which benefited the areas around metro stations.”

The infrastructure preceded the permission rather than the other way around.

“Bengaluru also had a similar metro TOD where developers were getting additional FAR around the metro radius,” Rajaura adds, “but I don’t think it is being implemented anymore.”

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Hyderabad, the comparison that surfaces most frequently in discussions of the FAR revision, is usually cited as evidence that removing density caps produces growth rather than chaos. Rajaura is sceptical of the analogy.

“Hyderabad does not face the same demand or the traffic or infrastructure stress faced by Bengaluru,” he says. “In terms of implementing overall planning norms, Hyderabad is much better. Land availability in Hyderabad is higher than Bengaluru, which has lesser land in the planning districts.”

And then the variable that underpins everything: “The primary factor in all this is demand.

Bengaluru has witnessed exponential growth.” Hyderabad’s wide roads preceded its towers not because its planners were more enlightened but because its growth pressure arrived later, giving infrastructure time to get ahead of density. That sequencing, Rajaura suggests, was less strategy than luck: “That is not a replicable model. It is a historical accident.”

Chennai, Rajaura notes, offers an under-examined counterpoint. The city has navigated coastal zoning restrictions, waterlogging issues, and a waterfront that severely constrains expansion, yet has managed to channel tech-driven growth into relatively coherent corridors because its constraints forced a discipline that less constrained cities could avoid.

Bengaluru has rarely been forced into that kind of discipline — it has always been able to grow outward when growing upward became complicated. The FAR revision changes that calculus, but whether Bengaluru has the institutional capacity to manage the change is the question the policy leaves conspicuously open.

The Pattern Bengaluru Keeps Repeating

Koramangala and Indiranagar have already lived this story at neighbourhood scale, and what they demonstrate should give anyone involved in the FAR revision pause.

Both neighbourhoods were transformed by commercial development that arrived before the infrastructure to support it. The results were not prosperity distributed across a modernised urban fabric but traffic that made the productivity gains of proximity largely theoretical, flooding that worsened with each monsoon as concrete surfaces multiplied and drainage capacity stayed fixed, and property values that rose faster than the civic services required to justify them.

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Residents of both areas have spent a decade navigating the consequences of approvals that assumed infrastructure which never arrived. “The development happened,” Rajaura says. “The infrastructure planning to support it did not happen at the same time. That is the pattern Bengaluru keeps repeating.”

The areas beyond the HAL airport’s 5-kilometre radius are now particularly exposed to a repetition of this pattern at far greater scale. Within that radius, aviation restrictions cap height and constrain development regardless of FAR entitlements, but beyond it those constraints lift entirely, and if the FAR revision generates development pressure in those zones before road networks are upgraded, the result will be high-density construction on infrastructure designed for a fraction of that load — Koramangala’s experience, reproduced across an industrial corridor.

The Bangalore Master Plan 2031, which was rejected by the public and sent back for revision, ran into precisely this credibility problem. Citizens did not oppose density in principle — they opposed density without a credible account of how roads, water, sewage, and public transport would be provided to support it.

The Transaction That Should Have Been

Rajaura’s proposed remedy goes to the heart of what the policy should have been and was not. “If it were up to me to change something within this policy,” he says, “I would definitely be more clear on where the money collected would be going and how exactly it would be used to relieve infrastructure stress. I would be more clear on which areas it is going to be implemented in — and before awarding FAR, a market survey should be done to assess which areas of Bengaluru will likely see the most extensive utilisation of FAR and whether those areas have the capacity to bear the inevitable infrastructure stress. If not, I would mandate the upgradation of urban infrastructure for the anticipated density that is going to be invited to the micromarket — and only post that should the FAR allowances be aligned with the infrastructure reality.”

The approval and the infrastructure upgrade, in his framing, should be the same transaction, not sequential events separated by years.

This would require a degree of coordination between KIADB, the BBMP (now GBA), and the planning authorities that has not historically existed. It would require that premium FAR be ring-fenced only for zones capable of handling the anticipated density and the infrastructure be deployed before the density arrives rather than after. Both conditions

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demand exactly the kind of institutional discipline that the 18-year CDP road-widening failure suggests has been in short supply. KIADB's 200-plus zones generate approximately 1.5 million jobs across Karnataka, and the industrial corridors now emerging are among the most consequential infrastructure investments India has made in a generation.

The opportunity to increase output per acre without consuming additional farmland is real, the demand is genuine, and the old FAR regime was indefensible. Nobody seriously disputes any of this.

But a policy that genuinely intended to enable vertical industrial transformation would have started with the roads, the drainage, the transit — and would have tied its revenue to the zones that need it most.

What Karnataka has produced instead is a policy that starts with the fees, leaves the infrastructure to the same institutions that have failed to deliver it for 18 years, and calls the result a skyline.

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